Spatial analysis of U.S. Supreme Court 5-to-4 decisions by Giansiracusa, Noah & Ricciardi, Cameron
SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF U.S. SUPREME COURT 5-TO-4 DECISIONS
NOAH GIANSIRACUSA∗ AND CAMERON RICCIARDI∗∗
ABSTRACT. While the U.S. Supreme Court is commonly viewed as comprising a liberal bloc and
a conservative bloc, with a possible “swing vote” or “median justice” between them, surprisingly
many case decisions are not explained by this simple model. We introduce a pair of spatial methods
for conceptualizing many 5-to-4 voting alignments that have occurred on the Court and which defy
the usual liberal/conservative dichotomy. These methods, utilizing higher order Voronoi diagrams
and halving lines, are based on the metric geometry of the two-dimensional ideal space locations ob-
tained from applying multidimensional scaling to voting data. We also introduce a two-dimensional
metric method for determining the crucial “fifth” vote in each 5-to-4 ruling and for determining the
median justice in any collection of terms within a natural court.
1. INTRODUCTION
A common perspective of the U.S. Supreme Court, dominant in both scholarly work from the last
several decades as well as popular and journalistic accounts, is that each of the nine justices serving
during a specified term is placed along a one-dimensional spectrum measuring in some manner
the liberal-to-conservative outlook of the justice. A typical situation is that the four most liberal
justices are viewed as a voting bloc, as are the four most conservative, and the unique justice lying
between these on the one-dimensional scale is considered a powerful “median justice,” capable
of joining either bloc and thus in essence deciding the outcome of every politically contentious
case with his or her “swing vote.”1 For instance, the 2009–2015 natural court is widely considered
to have a conservative bloc consisting of Alito, Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas, and a liberal bloc
consisting of Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor, with the swing vote provided by Kennedy
[8, 15].
While many case outcomes do neatly align with this one-dimensional picture, many do not and
so appear surprising, unusual, perplexing, disordered, etc. A highly salient example occurring
during the natural court mentioned above is the 2012 case National Federation of Independent
Businesses v. Sebelius, where Kennedy swung to the conservatives but Roberts shocked many
Supreme Court observers by defecting and providing the liberals with a crucial win in upholding
the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act on the grounds of the Constitution’s Taxing
and Spending Clause. The one-dimensional interpretation of this case is simply that Roberts voted
more liberally than expected and thus upset the traditional balance of the court. In the present
paper we introduce several mathematical methods for analyzing Supreme Court voting patterns,
by way of planar geometry, in order to provide deeper insight into cases such as this one and other
5-to-4 decisions.
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1This idea is so pervasive and taken to such extents that experts have advocated the following strategy: to win cases
being argued before the Supreme Court, one should identify the median justice and form the argument that maximizes
the chances of obtaining that justice’s swing vote (see [19, p.14] and [26, p.217]).
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2. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR WORK
The field of quantitative/empirical legal studies has been growing at a remarkable rate as data
sets and data analysis methods continue to improve [5, 16, 22, 35, 36]. Within this vast body of
literature are certain papers that apply deeply mathematical tools to study the behavior of the U.S.
Supreme Court. For instance, in recent years we have witnessed the application of: information
theory to determine the number of dimensions the justices vote in [38]; statistical physics to mea-
sure the influence justices exert on each other [25]; game theory to compute the voting power of
each justice [12]; machine learning to predict the outcome of cases [21, 23]; Bayesian methods to
estimate the political ideology of the justices [27]. While statistics drives these studies and plays an
implicit role in the present paper as well, one of our goals is to introduce more geometric methods
into this body of research. Since our focus is on 5-to-4 to decisions and swing votes and how these
interact with the dimensionality of the Supreme Court, we begin with a discussion of previous
investigations into these topics.
2.1. 5-to-4 votes and oddball coalitions. Given that a fully staffed Supreme Court comprises
nine sitting justices, the potential for any group of five of them to form a coalition is extremely
important and powerful. The following amusing piece of legal folklore concerning Justice William
Brennan, who served from 1956 until 1990, aptly captures this phenomenon:
At some point early in their clerkships, Brennan asked his clerks to name the most
important rule in constitutional law. Typically they fumbled, offering Marbury v.
Madison or Brown v. Board of Education as their answers. Brennan would reject
each answer, in the end providing his own by holding up his hand with the fingers
wide apart. This, he would say, is the most important rule in constitutional law.
Some clerks understood Brennan to mean that it takes five votes to do anything,
others that with five votes you could do anything. [40, p.763]
Despite the recognition of their significance,2 much remains to be understood about the formation
of coalitions of five—or, to put it another way, about the distribution of 5-to-4 voting patterns
among the nine justices. For instance, as Edelman astutely points out, the above-cited 2003 pa-
per that uses information theory to study Supreme Court voting patterns [38] also uses singular
value decomposition to approximate voting behavior yet “it is on the 5–4 decisions other than the
c[onservative]-l[iberal] split that this approximation performs at its worst, which is not that sur-
prising given that these are the decisions for which no one has a good theoretical explanation” [11,
p. 569].
In 1993 Riggs published an in-depth study of 5-to-4 decisions, focusing primarily on the fre-
quency of such cases and how this interacts with the ideology of the Court [31]. Riggs notes at the
time of his writing that “no systematic study of this voting pattern over an extended time period has
previously been published” [31, p.669]. He found a significant increase in the frequency of 5-to-4
decisions throughout the 20th century. In 2014, Friedland published a study of 5-to-4 decisions
focusing on the context of public response and the politicization of the Court [19]. He notes in
passing that “many cases can not be seen as dividing along liberal/conservative lines” [19, p. 43,
note 169]. So we are left in awkward situation: as the Brennan folklore illustrates, majorities of
2And prevalence: Enns and Wohlarth wrote in 2013 that, “Since 1946, 17% of all Supreme Court cases—and 37%
of ‘landmark decisions’—have been decided by one vote” [14, p.1101].
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size five are fundamental to Supreme Court jurisprudence, yet as Friedland points out many such
majorities are not the ones we expect and as Edelman emphasizes, these are precisely the cases for
which current theories are most deficient.
For many years the Harvard Law Review has published data on Supreme Court rulings, including
a tabulation of 5-to-4 decisions listing the number of decisions made by each coalition of five
justices. Cases resulting in 5-to-4 decisions by particularly striking coalitions have been studied
by many scholars, for example National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius [19, p.43],
Rogers v. Tennessee [13, p.819], Philip Morris v. Williams [13, p.820], Irizarry v. United States [14,
p.1092], Kyllo v. United States [39, p.35], to name just a few. Friedland reviewed 5-to-4 decisions,
emphasizing both individual cases and overall trends [19, p.17], and in 2016 Fischman and Jacobi
discussed a particular “unusual” five-justice coalition that occurred several times3 [18, p.1673].
In 2008, Edelman, Klein, and Lindquist defined a measure of the “disorder” of a judicial coali-
tion, indicating how far it is from the expected liberal/conservative divisions [13]. We shall discuss
this further below in §3.1—for now, we quote one of their intriguing findings concerning the most
disordered cases among the terms they analyze:
Many (but not all) of these disordered decisions involve legal questions that are
often very technical and, in that sense, less clearly “ideological.” First, most in-
volve statutory rather than constitutional interpretation, including, for example, the
Internal Revenue Code, the Antitrust Act, the Labor Management Relations Act,
the Hobbs Act, the Bankruptcy Code, the Freedom of Information Act, the postal
and mail fraud statutes, and the Copyright Act. Second, they often involve pro-
cedural rather than substantive matters, including service of process, jurisdiction,
counterclaims, summary judgment, and harmless error on appeal. [13, p.833]
In sum then, it seems that mathematical and statistical methods have been used to highlight in-
dividual cases decided by oddball coalitions and to convey overall trends in 5-to-4 decisions, but
for conceptualizing such cases and voting patterns scholars mostly rely on traditional direct legal
analysis.
2.2. Ideal points, multidimensional scaling, and the second dimension. The notion of “ideal
points” has been rather influential in political science, including Supreme Court scholarship. In
brief, in the context of the Supreme Court this refers to coordinatizing justices and/or cases in
some kind of ideology or policy space, invariably taken to be Euclidean space Rd for some d >
0. The most ubiquitous instance of this is assigning a real number (so d = 1) to each justice
representing their location on a liberal-to-conservative spectrum. In practice, there are various
ways of accomplishing this. The “Segal-Cover scores” are based on data external to the Court,
such as newspaper editorials [34]; the Bayesian “Martin-Quinn scores,” which use Markov chain
Monte Carlo methods to dynamically compute ideal points from longitudinal data, have been a
very successful and popular improvement [27]; Peress offers another statistical approach using
additional structure oriented toward the fact that the number of ideal points being estimated for the
Supreme Court is relatively small [30].
Another approach to computing ideal points is multidimensional scaling (MDS). Given a sym-
metric n× n matrix of nonnegative numbers, thought of as distances (or approximations thereof)
between n objects, and a positive integer d, MDS produces n points in Euclidean space Rd such
that their pairwise distances are close to the entries of the input matrix [4, 9]. To use MDS to
3Since the term “unusual” suggests rarity, which evidently is not accurate, we prefer the term “oddball” coalition
used by Edelman and Chen [12, p.68, note 24].
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compute Supreme Court ideal points, scholars typically4 take the i j entry of the 9×9 input matrix
to be one minus the fraction of cases during a given natural court that Justice i and Justice j voted
“together”—meaning either both with the majority or both against the majority5—and a widely
used way of accessing this information, which we use in the present paper as well, is the binary
“majority” variable in the Spaeth Supreme Court Database [37]. While the exact coordinates of
ideal points vary across the different estimation methods, in one dimension (d = 1) the order of the
nine justices for each natural court is remarkably consistent across the different methods and is gen-
erally compatible with expert opinion of the political leanings of the justices [18, pp.1693–4]—so
it is safe to view the first dimension in all these methods as quantifying the liberal-to-conservative
spectrum.6
But what of ideal points in higher (d > 1) dimensions?7 For Segal-Cover scores, one would
need to directly define these additional dimensions and somehow estimate them; however, for
ideal point estimation methods such as Martin-Quinn and MDS that rely on voting data, we can
compute coordinates in higher dimensions without having an a priori interpretation of the higher
dimensions. The standard MDS algorithm is inductive in the sense that it first finds the optimal
coordinates in the first dimension, then it fixes these and moves the points in the second dimension
to improve the distance approximations, etc., so that if d′ < d then the coordinates for the d′-
dimensional MDS are the projection onto the first d′ components of the coordinates of the d-
dimensional MDS. This means that it is a well-defined, and indeed fascinating, question to ask
what each dimension beyond the first of the MDS-based ideal points of Supreme Court justices
represents in a jurisprudential sense.
The pioneering work of Schubert in the 60s and 70s on applying MDS to voting records was
multi-dimensional [32, 33], though limits to computational capabilities at the time were signif-
icant. In 2002, Grofman and Brazill found that, “when properly used, MDS does not normally
create artifactual additional dimensions (e.g., an extremism dimension) the way that factor analy-
sis inevitably does when applied to attitudinal data or to data on voter choices or preferences that
has been generated by spatial proximity in unfolding terms” [7, p.56]. Hook in 2007 depicted the
d = 2 MDS coordinates for nine justices but did not attempt to interpret the second dimension
[20, p.254]. Peress in 2009 admits that interpreting the second dimension of his scores is a “dif-
ficult task,” but he finds “some evidence to suggest that the second dimension captures ‘judicial
activism”’ [30, p.286].
Arguably the most in-depth analysis of the second MDS dimension of the Supreme Court is
the aptly named 2016 paper by Fischman and Jacobi, which mostly focuses on the Roberts Court
[18]. They point out that since MDS is based on voting agreement rates it obviates the need to
determine the ideological direction of rulings, a notoriously subtle and subjective endeavor that
has continually plagued quantitative Supreme Court analysis. They also note that the planar layout
4Schubert largely initiated this approach in his seminal 1965 treatise [32], but Brazill and Grofman in 2002 pop-
ularized, modernized, and refined it, while also comparing it (favorably) to related methods such as factor analysis
[6].
5This means the disposition of the decision is what matters rather than the opinion, so for instance if two justices
ultimately reach the same conclusion but for different reasons and consequently write separate opinions, they are
nonetheless counted as voting together.
6A word of caution: MDS is only well-defined up to coordinate reflections, so liberal-to-conservative may show up
as either left-to-right or right-to-left, but it is usually straightforward to determine which is which and hence to fix the
direction.
7For a list of papers questioning the common assumption of a one-dimensional court, see [18, pp.1675–6, note 21].
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of the justices determined by MDS for the 2005–2008 terms is quite similar to that of the 2010–
2012 terms (among the justices serving on both), suggesting a certain robustness to MDS-based
estimation of ideal points.
Fischman and Jacobi use the Edelman-Klein-Lindquist disorder formula to compute two sepa-
rate disorder scores for each case, one for the projection of the d = 2 MDS ideal points onto the
first component and one for the projection onto the second component. They then study the cases
that have the most imbalanced scores in the sense that they are highly disordered in the first dimen-
sion but highly ordered in the second dimension—concluding that the second dimension should
be interpreted primarily as measuring legal methodology [18, p.1675], specifically “pragmatism
versus legalism” [18, p.1709].
While this work of Fischman and Jacobi is a significant step forward in embracing and under-
standing the second dimension, it curiously seems to mostly avoid studying the rich interactions
between the two dimensions,8 primarily adopting the perspective that cases are typically deter-
mined by the linear ordering of the justices in the first dimension but for cases which are not, the
next step is to consider the linear ordering of the justices in the second dimension. The authors
assert that “the second dimension also explains many of the coalitions that cannot be explained by
the first dimension,” [18, p.1679] so we see significant progress in addressing the concern Edelman
raised in 2004 that oddball coalitions are lacking in theoretical explication [11, p.569]. However,
this treatment of the two dimensions as independent manifestly leaves open the door for a deeper
analysis of the full planar geometry of d = 2 MDS-based ideal points, moving beyond the two
one-dimensional projections.9 Very simply put, one could look at lines of arbitrary slope and also
circles in the two-dimensional MDS space, rather than just vertical and horizontal lines; this is
largely the starting point for the present paper.
2.3. Swing votes and median justices. The intuitive idea of the “median justice” is that since
the Supreme Court has nine justices, the one who sits roughly in the middle, in an appropriate
sense, has tremendous power because he or she can cast the decisive fifth vote in any case that
otherwise splits evenly among the liberal and conservative blocs. A median justice who tends
to vacillate between these two political blocs is a “swing vote,” a designation associated with
great significance (and a behavior associated with great consternation). As important as both of
these concepts are, in practice they are rather subtle—nuances in the definitions and in quantitative
methods for measuring them can lead to varied outcomes and interpretations—and so they continue
to receive considerable attention in the empirical legal studies literature.
In 1990, Blasecki published a paper using statistical methods to determine whether Justice Pow-
ell, who was frequently referred to by the press and by other legal scholars as a swing vote, should
in fact be considered a swing vote [3]. Blasecki helpfully included a thorough discussion of prior
definitions of the term “swing vote” appearing in the scholarly literature [3, pp.532–4]; she then
proceeded to introduce a new quantitative definition, based on Guttmann scaling and bloc analysis,
and determined that Powell too frequently sided with the conservative justices to be considered
a swing vote overall. Powell was alleged to be most ideologically independent on issues of civil
liberties, so Blasecki focuses on civil liberties cases and concludes that the 1972–74 Courts show
no pivotal position, whereas in 1975–77 Justice White has broken off and becomes a pivotal swing
8An important exception however, and possibly their motivation for treating the two dimensions separately, is their
observation that “many of the disagreements within each bloc are orthogonal to the disagreements between the blocs”
[18, p.1679].
9For those who have studied algebraic geometry, this is somewhat analogous to the difference between the Zariski
topology on A2 and the product topology coming from the Zariski topology on A1.
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vote—and Justice Powell came closest to being a true swing vote in 1986 but even then his votes
were too frequently aligned with the conservative bloc [3, pp.539–40].
Grofman and Brazill in 2002 computed the d = 1 MDS ideal point coordinates for the justices
in each natural court and determined the median justice with regard to the left-to-right ordering of
these points [7]. Fischman and Jacobi, who had used d = 2 MDS, note that “In two dimensions,
different patterns of coalitions emerge: in the second dimension, it is the Chief Justice [Roberts]
and Justice Sotomayor, not Justice Kennedy, who sit at the median of the Court” [18, p.1671].
By this they mean that when projecting the MDS coordinates onto their second components, one
obtains a linear ordering with a different median than when projecting onto the first components.
In particular, they find Roberts at the median of the Court’s second dimension in the case National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius [18, p.1685], which helps explain the oddball ma-
jority leading to that 5-to-4 decision, though it still leaves open the question of why the second
dimension was so dominant in that case.
Martin, Quinn, and Epstein in 2005 studied median justices by using Martin-Quinn scores in-
stead of MDS and further progressed our understanding of the concept from both a theoretical and
an empirical standpoint [28]. Epstein and Jacobi introduced in 2008 the notion of a “super me-
dian,” a justice whose vote strongly influences (or at least correlates with) the majority vote10 [15].
One of their key insights is that the distances between the ideal points of the justices, not just the
relative orderings, are crucial. For instance, they found that Kennedy was a super median in 2006,
and they posit that this is because he not only was the fifth justice when ordered by ideology, but
there is a large “gap” between him and his ideological neighbors, Souter to his left and Alito to
his right [15, p.41]. They identify the following super medians: Clark in 1959, Goldberg in 1962,
White in 1971 (quite strongly) and 1982, 1983, 1987 and 1988, Powell in 1986, O’Connor in 1999,
but the most powerful in their paper is Kennedy in 2006 [15, p.67].
The popular view of Sandra Day O’Connor as a powerful swing vote was explored in 2004 by
Lowenthal and Palmer. They found that she had the highest percentage among the nine justices
of voting with the majority in 5-to-4 decisions from 1994 to 2002 (76.9%), followed by Kennedy
(74.4%) [26, p.230]. She wrote roughly the average number of majority opinions overall, but
when focusing on 5-to-4 decisions she wrote substantially more than expected, though Kennedy
is up there with her and unsurprisingly the Chief Justice wrote even more. Curiously, she wrote
an average number of concurring opinions (Scalia had the most) in general, but when focusing on
5-to-4 decisions she demonstrably took the lead in this measure [26, p.232].
In 2013, Enns and Wohlfarth extended the earlier work of Martin, Quinn, and Epstein [28] in-
vestigating median justices [14]. They computed the “5th vote” in all cases from 1953 to 2009,
meaning the 5th justice most likely to have joined the majority based on the locations of the one-
dimensional Martin-Quinn scores. Interestingly, they found that while the median justice is most
frequently the 5th vote, many times a justice other than the median casts the decisive 5th vote
[14, p.1095]. This finding leads them to posit that prior research on the swing vote is misleading:
the concept of a swing vote should be case-specific, rather than term-specific, they argue. In-
deed, “while the term-specific median justice casts the pivotal vote in more than half of all 5-to-4
decisions, more extreme justices account for 45% of these pivotal swing votes.” [14, p.1103].
3. METHODOLOGY
The first task we embark upon is to gain insight into the distribution of 5-to-4 decisions on the
Court—or, put another way, insight into the coalitions of size five that have formed on the Court.
10This is related to, but distinct from, the “voting power” of a justice as measured by Edelman and Chen [12].
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We rely on the widely-used Supreme Court Database [37] and declare a collection of five justices
to be a voting coalition if they provided the majority votes in a 5-to-4 decision. In the 2009–2015
natural court, there were sixteen different voting coalitions (shown in Table 1) out of the
(9
5
)
= 126
total possible groupings of five justices.
TABLE 1. The sixteen voting coalitions occurring during the 2009–2015 natural
court, listed alphabetically. The breadth here hints at how central, yet perplexing,
oddball coalitions are to Supreme Court jurisprudence.
(1) Alito Breyer Ginsburg Kagan Kennedy
(2) Alito Breyer Ginsburg Roberts Sotomayor
(3) Alito Breyer Kennedy Roberts Sotomayor
(4) Alito Breyer Kennedy Roberts Thomas
(5) Alito Breyer Roberts Scalia Thomas
(6) Alito Kennedy Roberts Scalia Thomas
(7) Alito Roberts Scalia Sotomayor Thomas
(8) Breyer Ginsburg Kagan Kennedy Sotomayor
(9) Breyer Ginsburg Kagan Roberts Scalia
(10) Breyer Ginsburg Kagan Roberts Sotomayor
(11) Breyer Ginsburg Kagan Sotomayor Thomas
(12) Breyer Kagan Kennedy Roberts Sotomayor
(13) Ginsburg Kagan Kennedy Roberts Scalia
(14) Ginsburg Kagan Kennedy Scalia Sotomayor
(15) Ginsburg Kagan Scalia Sotomayor Thomas
(16) Kagan Kennedy Scalia Sotomayor Thomas
Only two of these are the “obvious” voting coalitions—the liberal coalition (8) and the conserva-
tive coalition (6)—so one naturally wonders where the fourteen remaining voting coalitions came
from and how to interpret them, in a manner of speaking. We first consider a combinatorial model
in which justices shuffle along a one-dimensional ideal space; this is done primarily to encapsulate
the prevailing political perspective of the Supreme Court. Next, we introduce two geometric mod-
els relying on a two-dimensional MDS ideal space, one based on higher order Voronoi tessellations
and one based on linear subdivisions of the ideal space.
After studying the majority coalitions involved in 5-to-4 decisions, the next topics we turn to are
determining the decisive fifth vote in each 5-to-4 case and determining the median justice for each
natural court (or range of terms within a natural court). While both of these topics have previously
been addressed in the literature from a statistical perspective, we introduce geometric methods
based again on a two-dimensional MDS ideal space. To estimate the fifth vote we find the majority
justice most distant from the MDS focal point of the case, and to estimate the median justice we
find the justice closest to the MDS focal point of all nine justices. It is convenient to think of these
focal points as exerting a “circle of influence” on the justices, as we shall see.
3.1. Discrete disorder. Edelman, Klein, and Lindquist introduced a quantity they call disorder
which measures how much a given coalition deviates from the coalitions one expects based on a
one-dimensional voting model [13, p.821]. Their disorder scores are real numbers that depend on
the coordinates of the nine justices in a one-dimensional ideal space. We introduce here a discrete
variant of their measure, so that we can work instead with integer-valued disorder scores; we focus
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FIGURE 1. The one-dimensional MDS ideal point locations of the nine justices on
the 2009–2015 natural court. Breyer is just slightly to the left of Kagan, and Alito
is slightly to the left of Thomas.
on coalitions of size five, since that is our primary interest in this paper, but the definition readily
extends to coalitions of any size.
We first use one-dimensional MDS to place the nine justices in a natural court along the real
number line.11 Let us call the five leftmost justices on this scale and the five rightmost justices
the two “extreme blocs” (which are typically liberal and conservative, respectively, though that
interpretation is immaterial to the notion of disorder). Given a particular 5-to-4 vote, the discrete
disorder is the minimum number of adjacent transpositions required to transform this voting coali-
tion (i.e., the five majority justices in this case) into either of the two extreme blocs. More formally,
if we label the justices 1,2, . . . ,9 based on their one-dimensional MDS ordering, then the discrete
disorder of a voting coalition J = { j1, j2, j3, j4, j5}, where 1≤ j1 < j2 < j3 < j4 < j5 ≤ 9, is
disord(J) := min{
5
∑
k=1
jk− k,
5
∑
k=1
10− k− j6−k}.
In fact, we can use this formula to discuss the discrete disorder disord(J) of any set J of five
justices, whether or not they formed a voting coalition.
To illustrate this concept, let us consider again the 2009–2015 natural court. Figure 1 shows the
one-dimensional MDS ideal points for the nine justices, which orders the justices as follows:
Ginsburg < Sotomayor < Breyer < Kagan < Kennedy < Roberts < Scalia < Alito < Thomas.
We see that the two extreme blocs, as expected, are the liberal and conservative coalitions (labelled
(8) and (6), respectively, in Table 1). These extreme blocs are the only sets of five justices with
discrete disorder score zero. In Table 2 we list all the size five groups of justices with discrete
disorder at most three and indicate which of these occurs as a voting coalition.
11As noted earlier, this generally can be interpreted as a liberal-to-conservative scale. Other methods of estimating
one-dimensional ideal points are perfectly valid—we chose MDS to be consistent with the rest of the paper, where we
do analyses based on two-dimensional MDS. To compute the voting dissimilarity matrix that is fed into the classical
MDS algorithm, we take the i j entry to be one minus the following ratio: the number of cases in the Supreme Court
Database for the given natural court where Justice i and Justice j have the same value for the “majority” variable,
divided by the total number of cases in the natural court where all nine justices have a value recorded for this variable.
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TABLE 2. The sets of five justices with discrete disorder score at most three for the
2009–2015 natural court. The number in the second column from the right is the
discrete disorder score, and a check mark in the rightmost column indicates that this
set of justices occurred during this natural court as a voting coalition.
Alito Kennedy Roberts Scalia Thomas 0 X
Breyer Ginsburg Kagan Kennedy Sotomayor 0 X
Alito Kagan Roberts Scalia Thomas 1
Breyer Ginsburg Kagan Roberts Sotomayor 1 X
Alito Breyer Roberts Scalia Thomas 2 X
Alito Kagan Kennedy Scalia Thomas 2
Breyer Ginsburg Kagan Scalia Sotomayor 2
Breyer Ginsburg Kennedy Roberts Sotomayor 2
Alito Breyer Kennedy Scalia Thomas 3
Alito Breyer Ginsburg Kagan Sotomayor 3
Alito Kagan Kennedy Roberts Thomas 3
Alito Roberts Scalia Sotomayor Thomas 3 X
Breyer Ginsburg Kennedy Scalia Sotomayor 3
Ginsburg Kagan Kennedy Roberts Sotomayor 3
Note that many groups of five justices have a low disorder score and yet do not appear in any of
the 349 cases tallied12 during this natural court. On the other hand, the discrete disorder scores for
the sixteen voting coalitions, in increasing order, are:
0,0,1,2,3,4,4,4,5,5,6,6,8,8,8,9.
This illustrates the challenge with viewing oddball coalitions simply as a matter of disorder: many
low discrete disorder score groupings never occur, and many groupings that do occur (i.e., voting
coalitions) have strikingly high discrete disorder scores. For instance, the highest discrete disorder
score among the sixteen voting coalitions seen during this natural court is nine,13 yet the maximum
theoretically possible discrete disorder score is only ten, so this coalition is almost as disordered
as one could ever be. Moreover, of the 126 possible groupings, 114 of these have discrete disorder
score at most nine—so discrete disorder leaves much to be desired in terms of explaining which
voting coalitions one expects to see on the Court.
3.2. Voronoi coalitions. Voronoi diagrams first started gaining prominence in the 19th century,
in both pure mathematics and epidemiology, and have since found widespread use in a multitude
of settings [1]. A two-dimensional Voronoi diagram is a particular way of partitioning the plane
into convex regions: given a finite collection of “seed” points, there is a convex region around each
seed point consisting of all points in the plane closer to the given seed point than to all the other
seed points. A related construction is the higher order Voronoi diagram: the k-th order Voronoi
diagram partitions the plane into convex regions consisting of all points in the plane that have the
same set of k nearest seed points [24].
12Recall that we only consider cases in the Supreme Court Database where all nine justices have a value recorded
for the “majority” variable.
13This voting coalition occurred exactly once during this natural court, in 2015 when Alito, Breyer, Kennedy,
Roberts, and Sotomayor formed the majority in Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne.
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To study 5-to-4 vote patterns on a fixed natural court, we consider the two-dimensional MDS
locations of the nine justices (see Footnote 11 above for the technical details of what this means)
and take these as our seed points and then construct the corresponding 5th order Voronoi diagram.
Thus each convex region corresponds to a collection of five justices with some ideological focal
point in common—meaning that there is a point in our MDS plane such that these five justices are
precisely the five closest justices to that point. For a given natural court, we compute all the sets of
five justices that arise this way, let us call them Voronoi coalitions, and our primary question is how
these compare to the voting coalitions on that natural court. Notably, if an oddball voting coalition
happens to be a Voronoi coalition, then in some sense this “explains” the oddball coalition since it
reveals a geometric commonality uniting the five justices.
TABLE 3. The twenty Voronoi coalitions for the 2009–2015 natural court. The
numerical column displays the discrete disorder score (§3.1) and a checkmark indi-
cates the justices formed a voting coalition on this natural court (cf., Table 1).
Alito Breyer Kagan Kennedy Roberts 9
Alito Breyer Kennedy Roberts Scalia 6
Alito Breyer Kennedy Roberts Sotomayor 9 X
Alito Breyer Kennedy Roberts Thomas 4 X
Alito Kagan Kennedy Roberts Scalia 5
Alito Kagan Roberts Scalia Thomas 1
Alito Kennedy Roberts Scalia Thomas 0 X
Breyer Ginsburg Kagan Kennedy Sotomayor 0 X
Breyer Ginsburg Kagan Scalia Sotomayor 2
Breyer Ginsburg Kennedy Roberts Sotomayor 2
Breyer Kagan Kennedy Roberts Scalia 10
Breyer Kagan Kennedy Roberts Sotomayor 5 X
Ginsburg Kagan Kennedy Roberts Scalia 8 X
Ginsburg Kagan Kennedy Roberts Sotomayor 3
Ginsburg Kagan Kennedy Scalia Sotomayor 4 X
Ginsburg Kagan Kennedy Scalia Thomas 9
Ginsburg Kagan Roberts Scalia Thomas 8
Ginsburg Kagan Scalia Sotomayor Thomas 8 X
Kagan Kennedy Roberts Scalia Sotomayor 9
Kagan Kennedy Roberts Scalia Thomas 4
The Voronoi coalitions for the 2009–2015 natural court listed in Table 3 show that 40% of the
Voronoi coalitions are voting coalitions, and 50% of the voting coalitions are Voronoi coalitions.
Thus, roughly half of the 5-to-4 cases in this natural court comport with our Voronoi model of
Supreme Court voting—which is quite remarkable given how many oddball, highly disordered
coalitions arise here and given the limited progress in the literature so far in explaining them
conceptually. In particular, the most disordered voting coalition from this natural court (the Alito-
Breyer-Kennedy-Roberts-Sotomayor majority in the 5-to-4 case Comptroller of the Treasury of
Maryland v. Wynne) quite strikingly is a Voronoi coalition (see Figure 2)—so the case that a tra-
ditional one-dimensional, liberal-to-conservative model struggles the most to explain fits perfectly
in our two-dimensional Voronoi spatial model.
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FIGURE 2. The 5th order Voronoi diagram for the two-dimensional MDS locations
of the nine justices in the 2009–2015 natural court. The blue region (left) consists
of all points whose five nearest justices are the liberal coalition of Breyer, Gins-
burg, Kagan, Kennedy, and Sotomayor. The red region (right) corresponds to the
conservative coalition: Alito, Kennedy, Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas. The green
region (top) corresponds to the voting coalition with the highest discrete disorder
score: Alito, Breyer, Kennedy, Roberts, and Sotomayor. The yellow region (bot-
tom) corresponds to another interesting oddball voting coalition: Ginsburg, Kagan,
Kennedy, Roberts, and Scalia.
3.3. Halving lines. Edelman describes spatial voting models as an “attempt to identify each Jus-
tice with an ideal point in a policy space and then model issues as cutting planes in such a way
that the set of Justices on one side of the plane vote one way and those on the other vote the
opposite” [11, p.10]. However, we have been unable to find in the literature on Supreme Court
rulings a systematic implementation and analysis of this concept for dimensions greater than one,
so we embark upon that here—in the specific context of 5-to-4 decisions. Namely, we fix a natu-
ral court and consider the nine justices in planar coordinates given by two-dimensional MDS and
then declare any five justices to be a half-plane coalition if there exists a line dividing the plane
such that the five justices lie on one side and the remaining four justices lie on the other side. In
the mathematics literature, specifically in discrete geometry, these half-plane coalitions are called
“k-sets” for k = 5 [10]. This provides another two-dimensional spatial model of Supreme Court
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FIGURE 3. Illustration of a line dividing the 2009–2015 natural court MDS plane
into two halves, showing that the oddball voting coalition of Alito, Breyer, Kennedy,
Roberts, and Sotomayor is a half-plane coalition.
voting—the key here is that, in contrast to the work of Fischman and Jacobi [18] where only ver-
tical and horizontal lines are considered, lines of arbitrary slope are allowed and thereby split the
justices along a combination of the traits characterized by each dimension. As with the Voronoi
coalitions, we are interested in how these half-plane coalitions compare with, and help explain, the
voting coalitions.
TABLE 4. The ten half-plane coalitions for the 2009–2015 natural court. The nu-
merical column displays the discrete disorder score (§3.1) and a checkmark indi-
cates the justices formed a voting coalition on this natural court.
Alito Breyer Ginsburg Kennedy Sotomayor 4
Alito Breyer Kennedy Roberts Sotomayor 9 X
Alito Breyer Kennedy Roberts Thomas 4 X
Alito Kagan Roberts Scalia Thomas 1
Alito Kennedy Roberts Scalia Thomas 0 X
Breyer Ginsburg Kagan Kennedy Sotomayor 0 X
Breyer Ginsburg Kagan Scalia Sotomayor 2
Breyer Ginsburg Kennedy Roberts Sotomayor 2
Ginsburg Kagan Roberts Scalia Thomas 8
Ginsburg Kagan Scalia Sotomayor Thomas 8 X
For the 2009–2015 natural court (see Table 4), 50% of the half-plane coalitions are also voting
coalitions and 31.25% of the voting coalitions are half-plane coalitions; this model also explains
some highly disordered odd-ball coalitions (for an example, see Figure 3). Curiously, on this
natural court every group of five justices that is simultaneously a voting coalition and a half-plane
coalition is also a Voronoi coalition.
3.4. Determining the fifth vote. Perhaps the most important question one can ask about a 5-to-
4 vote on the Supreme Court is which of the five justices in the majority came closest to voting
with the four-justice minority, thereby flipping the ruling to the opposite outcome. While such
information cannot truly be ascertained, we nonetheless use our two-dimensional spatial model
to propose two methods for ranking the majority votes so that we can label one justice as having
provided the crucial “fifth” vote in a 5-to-4 decision (see [14] for another approach).
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For a particular natural court, we first consider the two-dimensional MDS layout of the nine
justices. Next, for each 5-to-4 vote we consider the five justices in the majority and take the mean
of their MDS coordinates; this yields what can be interpreted as the focal point of the majority
perspective of the case. Then, we order the majority justices by their distance from this focal
point—from closest to furthest—and declare the fifth one to be the one who cast the decisive fifth
vote. In a distinct but related manner, we also take the four minority justices, compute their mean
coordinates to identify the focal point of the minority perspective, then order the majority justices
based on their distance to this focal point—this time, from furthest to closest—and declare the fifth
one to have cast the decisive fifth vote. The idea here is that in the first method we have identified
the majority justice least strongly allied with the majority outlook, and in the second method we
found the majority justice most sympathetic to the minority outlook.
In some situations these two methods yield the same fifth vote, but in others they do not. For
the voting coalitions listed in Table 1, nine out of sixteen times the two methods agree. The liberal
coalition and the conservative coalition (numbers (8) and (6), respectively, in that table) both have
Kennedy as the fifth vote for both methods, which matches the general view of Kennedy as the
predominate swing vote on that Court. The voting coalition numbered (10) in Table 1, which
occurred for instance in the famous Affordable Care Act case National Federation of Independent
Businesses v. Sebelius, has Roberts labelled as the fifth vote by both methods; this supports the
standard view that in this case Roberts unexpectedly cast the decisive vote supporting a generally
liberal cause. Another interesting example is the voting coalition numbered (14) in Table 1, which
occurred in a variety of cases; here the first method (based on proximity to majority focal point)
finds Scalia as the fifth vote whereas the second method (based on proximity to the minority focal
point) finds Kennedy as the fifth vote.
It is convenient to think of these ideological focal points as exerting circles of influence, with
the justices closest to the center of the circle most strongly aligned with the corresponding outlook
on the case. In a 5-to-4 decision the majority focal point reaches outward and collects five justices,
the last one being the least steadfast in his or her vote; the minority focal point reaches outward and
the first justice in the majority it reaches is the one most tempted to defect. This idea is illustrated
in Figure 4 with the voting coalitions discussed in the preceding paragraph.
3.5. The mean justice. We now turn from the case-specific swing vote to the term-specific and
court-specific swing vote. Given a natural court or collection of cases within a natural court,
we first compute the two-dimensional MDS layout of the justices corresponding to the voting
similarity matrix for these cases. Next, we compute the mean of the two coordinates of all nine
justices to find the focal point of the entire Court. We then label the justice whose Euclidean
distance to this focal point is minimal the mean justice. Since we are dealing with two dimensions
rather than one we must use a mean rather than a median—so our choice of terminology here is to
suggest a similarity to, but distinction from, the notion of “median justice” that appears frequently
in the literature.
For the 2009–2015 natural court, the mean justice is Kennedy; this supports the common view
of him as the predominate swing vote on this Court. When computing MDS coordinates for each
term separately, we find that Kennedy was the mean justice for each term within this natural court
except for 2013, where the distinction goes to Roberts, and 2015, where Breyer becomes the mean
justice. Since Roberts was the mean justice for the 2013 term, this perhaps helps explain why he
was in a position to cast the decisive fifth vote in the 2012 case National Federation of Independent
Businesses v. Sebelius—though this does not explain the particular direction of his vote, which is
admittedly the far more surprising and significant aspect of this case.
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FIGURE 4. Circles of influence illustrating the decisive fifth vote for three different
voting coalitions. In all three cases the names of the majority votes are in bold
and their focal point is indicated by a triangle N whereas the minority focal point
is a square . (a) The majority is the liberal coalition and both spatial methods
find Kennedy as the fifth vote. (b) This voting coalition occurred, among other
instances, in the 2012 ruling supporting the Affordable Care Act and both spatial
methods find Roberts as the fifth vote. (c) The two spatial methods disagree on
this voting coalition: Scalia is the fifth vote when using the majority focal point,
whereas Kennedy is the fifth vote when using the minority focal point.
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4. RESULTS
We begin with a broad view of our spatial models and then focus on a specific case to illustrate
the insight that can be gleaned from our geometric perspective.
TABLE 5. Overview of our spatial methods applied to the natural courts in the
Supreme Court Database [37]. “Voting coalitions” is the number of distinct voting
coalitions (i.e., groups of five justices forming the majority in a 5-to-4 case) in the
specified natural court. “Max disorder” is the highest discrete disorder score among
the voting coalitions. “Voronoi accuracy” lists the percentage of voting coalitions
that are also Voronoi coalitions, then the percentage of Voronoi coalitions that are
also voting coalitions. “Half-plane accuracy” lists the percentage of voting coali-
tions that are also half-plane coalitions, then the percentage of half-plane coalitions
that are also voting coalitions. “Mean justice” is defined in §3.5.
Natural Voting Max Voronoi Half-plane Mean
court coalitions disorder accuracy Half-plane justice
1946–1948 28 10 35.7%, 50% 25%, 70% Vinson
1949–1952 26 9 30.8%, 50% 23.1%, 42.9% Burton
1953–1953 8 10 37.5%, 15.8% 37.5%, 27.3% Clark
1954–1956 8 6 75%, 28.6% 62.5%, 55.6% Clark
1956–1956 5 8 80%, 21.1% 80%, 36.4% Brennan
1956–1958 10 9 60%, 31.6% 40%, 40% Brennan
1958–1961 18 9 44.4%, 40% 33.3%, 60% Brennan
1962–1964 18 9 33.3%, 33.3% 33.3%, 40% White
1965–1966 12 9 58.3%, 38.9% 58.3%, 58.3% White
1967–1968 6 10 50%, 15.8% 16.7, 8.3% Marshall
1969–1970 15 7 33.3%, 26.3% 33.3%, 50% White
1971–1975 23 10 43.5%, 50% 39.1%, 90% Stewart
1975–1980 33 10 33.3%, 57.9% 30.3%, 90.9% Powell
1981–1985 33 10 33.3%, 57.9% 27.3%, 81.8% White
1986–1986 13 8 38.5%, 26.3% 38.5%, 45.5% Powell
1987–1989 19 8 42.1%, 44.4% 31.6%, 60% White
1990–1990 15 10 60%, 47.4% 60%, 75% Souter
1991–1992 20 9 40%, 44.4% 40%, 66.7% Souter
1993–1993 6 9 66.7%, 22.2% 66.7%, 36.4% Kennedy
1994–2004 38 10 34.2%, 72.2% 28.9%, 100% Kennedy
2005–2005 2 0 100%, 9.5% 100%, 16.7% O’Connor
2005–2008 14 10 42.9%, 31.6% 42.9%, 60% Kennedy
2009–2009 8 10 50%, 22.2% 50%, 40% Kennedy
2009–2015 16 9 50%, 40% 31.2%, 50% Kennedy
2016–2016 2 0 100%, 12.5% 100%, 14.3% Kennedy
For each of the two accuracy columns listed in Table 5, the first number should be thought
of as the percentage of voting coalitions “explained” by the specified spatial model, while the
second number measures how “efficiently” the model explains these voting coalitions. A model
that simply lists all possible sets of five justices would always have a perfect 100% for its first
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FIGURE 5. The minimum of the first and second accuracy rates (“explained” per-
centage and “efficiency” percentage) for each of the natural courts in the Supreme
Court Database; plus + denotes the Voronoi model, triangle 4 denotes the half-
plane model.
accuracy score but its second accuracy score would be extremely low. On the other hand, a model
that only predicts two coalitions, the liberal coalition and the conservative coalition, would have
a nearly perfect second accuracy score—but aside from the brief natural courts occurring during
the 2005 and 2016 terms, such a model would generally have a very low first accuracy score.
These considerations show that it is not difficult to construct a model where the average of the two
accuracy scores is at least 50% for each natural court; what is more challenging, and significant, is
constructing models where the minimum of the two accuracy scores is as high as possible for each
natural court—see Figure 5 for this measure of our two spatial models.
We find some rather striking results in Table 5. For instance, the long 1994–2004 natural court
saw a whopping thirty-eight different voting coalitions, and the half-plane model only found eleven
coalitions but every single one it found is a true voting coalition. The discrete disorder scores
for these eleven coalitions range from zero to nine. The coalition with discrete disorder nine is
the majority of Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, O’Connor, and Rehnquist, and a minority of Scalia,
Souter, Stevens, and Thomas, which occurred in precisely one ruling, namely, the 2005 case United
States v. Booker on U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The half-plane model also found eleven coalitions
on the 1975–1980 natural court, of which ten were among the thirty-three actual voting coalitions,
and it found ten coalitions on the 1971–1975 natural court, of which nine were among the twenty-
three actual voting coalitions. Both the half-plane model and the Voronoi model found four out of
the five voting coalitions on the 1956 natural court; both methods missed the majority of Black,
Burton, Harlan, Douglas, and Warren, versus the minority of Brennan, Clark, Frankfurter, and
Reed, which occurred in the 1956 case Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Company v. United States.
The first accuracy scores for the Voronoi model tend to be slightly higher than those of the half-
plane model, while the second accuracy scores tend to be somewhat lower. Indeed, the mean first
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accuracy rates are 50.9% for Voronoi and 45.2% for half-plane, while the mean second accuracy
rates are 35.6% for Voronoi and 52.6% for half-plane. A particularly strong year for both the
Voronoi and half-plane models is the rather wild 1990 natural court, which saw fifteen voting
coalitions in a single term.
Our mean justice column in Table 5 supports the general view of Kennedy as a swing vote—or
at least as a justice central to the Court’s behavior—for a lengthy stretch of years. Powell and
O’Connor, both considered swing votes by various authors (cf., §2.3) also show up as the mean
justice. It is interesting to compare the natural court mean justices with the term-specific mean
justices (see Table 6).
TABLE 6. The term-specific mean justices for the past forty years. Bold names are
also the mean justice for the corresponding natural court.
Term Mean justice Term Mean justice Term Mean justice Term Mean justice
1977 Stewart 1987 White 1997 Kennedy 2007 Roberts
1978 Blackmun 1988 White 1998 Kennedy 2008 Kennedy
1979 White 1989 White 1999 O’Connor 2009 Kennedy
1980 White 1990 Souter 2000 O’Connor 2010 Kennedy
1981 Blackmun 1991 Kennedy 2001 Kennedy 2011 Kennedy
1982 Burger 1992 Kennedy 2002 Kennedy 2012 Kennedy
1983 White 1993 Kennedy 2003 O’Connor 2013 Roberts
1984 Powell 1994 Kennedy 2004 Kennedy 2014 Kennedy
1985 Powell 1995 Kennedy 2005 O’Connor 2015 Breyer
1986 Powell 1996 O’Connor 2006 Kennedy 2016 Kennedy
While Epstein and Jacobi [15] introduce the notion of a “super median justice,” here we might
estimate the strength of a mean justice by noting how often the term-specific and natural court-
specific mean justices coincide. We see in Table 6 that Kennedy certainly qualifies as a strong
mean justice, and arguably White does as well.
4.1. Illustration of methods on a single case. Let us consider the 2001 case Rogers v. Ten-
nessee, which was also used by Edelman, Klein, and Lindquist to motivate their study of disordered
Supreme Court votes [13]. We quote from Oyez:
Wilbert K. Rogers was convicted in Tennessee of second degree murder. The vic-
tim, James Bowdery, died 15 months after Rogers stabbed him. On appeal, Rogers
argued that the Tennessee common law “year and a day rule,” under which no de-
fendant could be convicted of murder unless his victim died by the defendant’s act
within a year and a day of the act, persisted and precluded his conviction. The
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction. In affirming, the
Tennessee Supreme Court ultimately abolished the rule and upheld Rogers’ con-
viction. [29]
Edelman et al. nicely frame the oddity of the oddball coalition that decided this case:
The Rogers case raised the important civil liberties question of whether judicially
created criminal rules may be applied retroactively under the Due Process Clause.
On the U.S. Supreme Court, one might expect such a case to trigger a predictable
lineup of the Justices’ votes, with conservatives adopting the “law and order” in-
terpretation and liberals the prodefendant’s rights approach. Yet the votes did not
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FIGURE 6. The two-dimensional MDS layout of the justices on the 1994–2004
natural court, with the majority votes in the 2001 case Rogers v. Tennessee in bold.
The majority focal point is marked with a triangle N, the minority focal point is
marked with a square , and a plus + marks the center of the entire Court. The inner
circle reaches out from the minority focal point and touches the closest majority
justice, Kennedy, while the outer circle reaches out from the majority focal point to
the fifth majority vote, namely Ginsburg.
fall out this way. Instead, O’Connor’s opinion of the Court, holding that Rogers’s
due process rights were not violated by the retroactive application of the rule was
joined not just by conservatives Rehnquist and Kennedy, but also by moderate lib-
erals Souter and Ginsburg. The most liberal member of the Court, Stevens, was
joined in dissent by the moderate Breyer and the strongly conservative Thomas and
Scalia. [13, p.820]
To begin our spatial analysis, consider the two-dimensional MDS layout of the justices and
the two circles of influence (recall §3.4) emanating from the majority and minority focal points,
as depicted in Figure 6. One of the most striking properties exhibited here is that the majority
focal point and the minority focal point are extremely close to each other and to the center of the
Court. What seems to distinguish the majority justices from the minority justices is not a left-right
divide nor even a North-South divide on the somewhat mysterious second dimension, but rather the
centrality of their locations. Indeed, for the most part the minority justices are the more “extreme”
justices in a two-dimensional, radial sense—that is, they tend to be further from the center of the
court, whereas the majority justices are primarily clustered closer toward the center.
This intriguing situation suggests that this voting coalition is not a half-plane coalition—it would
be, were it not for Breyer’s minority vote preventing an appropriately placed horizontal line from
separating a Northern minority from a Southern majority—but that it is a Voronoi coalition whose
corresponding convex region is located near the center of the court. Both of these assertions are
indeed verified by our algorithms; see Figure 7 for the 5th order Voronoi diagram showing a promi-
nent North-central trapezoidal region uniting the majority justices.
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FIGURE 7. The 5th order Voronoi diagram for the two-dimensional MDS layout of
the justices on the 1994–2004 natural court. The majority justices in Rogers v. Ten-
nessee are in upper-case, and the convex region they correspond to in the Voronoi
diagram is filled in solid. This solid gray trapezoidal region can be interpreted as an
estimate of where this case lies in this two-dimensional MDS ideal space.
Turning back to the circles of influence in Figure 6, we see an intricate assessment of the decisive
fifth vote in this case. First, recall that the mean justice for this natural court is Kennedy (Table 5),
but the term-specific mean justice for the years surrounding this case vacillates between Kennedy
and O’Connor (Table 6). Indeed, Kennedy and O’Connor both orbit around the center of the Court
without one or the other consistently taking the dominant role in these years. The fifth vote as
determined by proximity to the minority focal point (i.e., the majority justice most tempted by
the minority outlook) is Kennedy, as is seen by his proximity to the square  in Figure 6, which
accords with his status as a frequent swing vote.
However, the fifth vote as determined by proximity to the majority focal point (i.e., the majority
justice least convinced of the majority outlook) is Ginsburg, since she is the furthest majority
justice from the triangle N in Figure 6. This makes sense from a political perspective, as Ginsburg
is viewed as a traditionally liberal justice and so would be tempted by the prodefendant’s rights
viewpoint, as Edelman et al. point out. But it also makes sense from a geometric perspective:
Ginsburg’s placement fairly far to the left of the Court means she is rather far from the centrally
located ideological focal point of this case.
In summary, we see that this particularly perplexing oddball coalition is nicely conceptualized
by the Voronoi spatial model. The majority consists of a mixture of both liberal and conservative
justices, and while it mostly comprises the more centrist justices among these, a one-dimensional
liberal-to-conservative perspective fails here since the minority vote of Breyer is more central than
the majority vote of Ginsburg. What distinguishes Breyer from the majority is his vertical distance
from the center of the court. One could interpret the vertical axis as in [18] to try to explain Breyer’s
vote, but even without a legalistic interpretation we still see a compelling story geometrically: the
five majority justices have a “common ground,” so to speak, which is the trapezoidal Voronoi
region depicted in Figure 7 just north of the center of the court. Thus, the majority is not the five
most central justices in any one-dimensional scale, nor even the five most central justices in our
two-dimensional MDS space (since that would include Breyer and lose Ginsburg), but it is the five
justices most closely clustered around an idealogical point just north of the center of the Court.
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5. CONCLUSION
The main motivation for this study is the observation of Edelman that Supreme Court majorities
which deviate from the expected liberal-conservative schism lack a robust theoretical framework
[11, p. 569]. Progress has been made by various authors since Edelman made this remark, and
a significant step forward was achieved in particular by Fischman and Jacobi when they uncov-
ered some appealing structure in the Court’s second dimension that helps explain certain oddball
coalitions [18]. This important work of Fischman and Jacobi further motivates the project un-
dertaken in the present paper, which is a deeper geometrical exploration of the two-dimensional
voting behavior of the Supreme Court. We employ notions from mathematics such as k-sets, higher
order Voronoi diagrams, and arrangements of circles to investigate the rich interactions between
Fischman and Jacobi’s two dimensions of the Court..
This provides new spatial models for understanding swing votes and median justices, as well
as spatial models for conceptualizing the distribution of 5-to-4 majorities on the Court. The latter
accord with historical voting records in approximately one third to half of the scenarios, thus
making tremendous strides towards a comprehensive theory of oddball and “unexpected” Supreme
Court rulings, while still leaving room for significant further improvements. Our spatial methods,
moreover, provide a collection of practical, computational tools for analyzing individual cases that
can lead to new insight into the forces pulling the justices’ votes in different directions and which
can help uncover previously unnoticed idealogical common ground uniting various justices.
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